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Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit:
The Origins and Operation of the Ninth Circuit’s
Limited En Banc Court
Arthur D. Hellman
Abstract
Once again, Congress is considering legislation to divide the largest of the federal
judicial circuits, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit extends over
nine western states, including California, and it has 29 active judges, almost twice the
number of the next-largest circuit. Much of the debate over proposals for restructuring
focuses on a feature unique to the Ninth Circuit, the limited en banc court (LEBC). In all
of the other circuits, when the court of appeals grants rehearing en banc, the case is
heard by all active judges. In the Ninth Circuit, the en banc court is composed of 11
judges – the chief judge and 10 other judges selected at random for each case from
among the active judges. Eleven judges constitute little more than one-third of the full
court. Proponents of restructuring argue that the LEBC cannot satisfactorily perform
the functions of en banc rehearing – in particular, maintaining consistency in the law of
the circuit.
This book chapter examines the origins and operation of the Ninth Circuit’s
limited en banc court. It draws on internal court memoranda and interviews with the
judges; it also includes an empirical study of en banc balloting during the first six years
under the LEBC rule.
The LEBC was authorized by legislation enacted by Congress in 1978. Even before
the bill was passed, the Ninth Circuit’s judges began discussing how the en banc function
might be performed by a body composed of fewer than all active judges. The discussions
continued over a period of two years before the en banc rule – still in force today, with
minor changes – was adopted.
This book chapter traces in detail the evolution of the rule. It shows that the
judges initially favored a nine-judge LEBC and a “permanent rotation” system, under
which judges would serve for a designated period of time, with new judges rotating on
at staggered intervals. Examining the process by which the judges shifted to the random
selection approach provides a fascinating picture of judges working together to reshape
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an institution within the court. It also sheds light on the judges’ view of how an
intermediate appellate court should function.
The chapter also examines the Ninth Circuit’s efforts, during the first six years
under the LEBC rule, to maintain consistency and coherence in the law of the circuit.
The research shows that the formal en banc process is only one way in which the judges
take steps to avoid conflicts between panel decisions. At the same time, en banc
rehearing has not been not treated primarily as a device for maintaining consistency
within the circuit. For example, review of the memoranda exchanged by the judges
reveals that assertions of intracircuit conflict were made in fewer than half of the cases
in which a judge called for a vote on rehearing a case en banc.
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The Lazo of the Circuit
it is sound to concentrate on inconsistency, which I agree reflects a
malfunction in the system, and not to worry overmuch about unpre
dictability, which is to a large extent unavoidable.

bnplications for the Future
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that the Ninth Circuit's
efforts to maintain consistency in the law of the circuit deserve atten
tion in part because the development of large, geographically orga
nized appellate courts may provide an alternative to more radical
structural reforms in the federal system. Yet in assessing the results of
the study, it is necessary to keep in mind some important limitations.
First, I have made no effort to investigate possible conflicts in un
published opinions. To be sure, from the standpoint of lawyers and
district courts any such conflicts would be irrelevant because un
published opinions cannot be cited as precedent. But they would be
troublesome from the standpoint of the court's obligation to treat like
cases alike-the more so since the profession has no way of monitor
ing this aspect of the court's work. 64 Thus, I hope that some other
scholar will take a look at the unpublished opinions in the not-too
distant future.
Second, more work remains to be done in exploring the nature and
extent of multiple-precedent issues. I acknowledge that, even where
the three-part test would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a
conflict existed, the need to reconcile multiple precedents itself places
a burden on judges and lawyers that must be taken into account in
evaluating the workability of the large appellate court. At the same
time, I do not think it unreasonable to assume at least a modest level of
care in defining the "issue" in a case.
Third, even if the study could provide complete data on the inci
dence of actual conflicts, there would still be room for disagreement
over the degree of freedom that panels ought to have in treating
existing precedents. Just as with intercircuit conflicts, variations in
approach that would be seen by some as nothing more than the
common law "work[ing] itself pure from case to case" 65 will be re
garded by others as creating an undesirable level of uncertainty and
unpredictability.
MTherc is reason to believe that panel majorities sometimes agree to decide a case by
unpublished memorandum as the price of avoiding a dissent.
65 Graham Hughes, "Are J
ustices Just?" N. Y. Rev. Books, Nov. 19, 1981, at 41, 42
(quoting Lord Mansfield).
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